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"The presumptuous hope of success seems…..to entice so many adventurers into those 
hazardous trades, that their competition reduces their profit below what is sufficient to 
compensate the risk" Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1796), Book 1, Chapter 10. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Most governments encourage entrepreneurship on the assumption that it is 
unequivocally a good thing, promoting market competition, innovation and economic growth. 
For individuals, the attractions of self-employment include personal autonomy, the 
opportunity to take risk for financial reward, life-style flexibility and tax avoidance (e.g. 
Scheinberg and McMillan, 1988; Dennis, 1996; Amit et al., 2001; Douglas and Shepherd, 
2002; Cassar, 2007). If, as Hamilton (2000) finds, median self-employment income is lower 
than that in paid employment, or as Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgenson (2004) report, starting 
a business involves higher risk but lower expected returns than for stock market investment, 
these may be prices worth paying. As long as nascent entrepreneurs appreciate the trade-offs, 
there is no particular cause for concern. However, accumulating evidence suggests that the 
self-employed overestimate their prospects by more than employees do. This does not 
necessarily mean that entry into self-employment is excessive. Those selecting self-
employment may have an optimistic disposition, in which case they will also tend to 
overestimate their prospects in paid employment. If returns are exaggerated to the same 
extent in both activities, the choice of employment mode will be the same as if expectations 
are realistic. It is only if individuals are more optimistic about self-employment than paid-
employment that entry will be excessive. As planning and running a new business are 
activities that involve a high perception of self-control and offer few barriers to fantasy, they 
may be fertile conditions for optimism. 
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 Previous research fails to disentangle these effects because it addresses potential 
associations between optimism and choice of employment mode using cross-sectional data. 
Consequently, the issue of whether a predisposition towards optimism leads individuals into 
business formation activity or whether business formation encourages over-optimistic 
expectations remains unresolved. Does the relative optimism of the self-employed reflect 
their intrinsic psychology or is it a side effect of planning and running a new business? 
According to de Meza and Southey (1996), both elements must be present if optimism is to 
be a cause of self-employment. Were it equally easy to be optimistic concerning prospects in 
self-employment and paid employment there is no particular reason why intrinsic optimists 
should be especially attracted by self-employment. Investigation of this issue is only possible 
with longitudinal data. 
 
 To investigate these matters, this paper uses data on a large sample of individuals in 
the UK tracked annually since 1991. This data source is rich in the sense that it allows 
sequential observation of financial expectations, financial realizations and transitions into and 
out of self-employment. However, as explained in the paper, the categorical nature of the data 
presents various research challenges. 
 
 The key finding of the paper is that the future self-employed display above average 
financial optimism even whilst in paid employment and their optimism becomes greater still 
on becoming self-employed. Those choosing self-employment in the future are therefore 
intrinsically more optimistic than those who do not. Moreover, self-employment encourages 
optimism. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the background to the 
questions, identifies some problematic research issues, and proposes strategies to address 
them. Section 3 describes the longitudinal data source and develops the empirical 
methodology. This is applied in section 4. Section 5 provides final discussion and 
conclusions. An appendix presents alternative empirical approaches. 
 
2. Background and development of research issues 
 
 There is no completely settled definition of an entrepreneur. Someone who starts a 
business that employs others is certainly an entrepreneur. Nevertheless, this is not entirely 
distinct from what, say, a self-employed literary agent does. In this paper, self-employed 
status is used as an indicator of entrepreneurship. This measure is practical, but may be too 
inclusive. The accountant with a private practice and an office over a shop may not be a hero 
of creative destruction. However, as Adam Smith said of the family grocer: “He must have all 
the knowledge, in short, that is necessary for a great merchant, which nothing hinders him 
from becoming but the want of sufficient capital.” (Wealth of Nations, Book. 1, Ch. 10). The 
self-employed are typically residual income recipients and willingness to embrace this role 
suggests they have much in common with narrower definitions of entrepreneurs. Self-
employment is the most commonly used measure of individual entrepreneurial status where 
researchers rely on secondary analysis of existing data (e.g. Amit et al. (1995), Burke et al. 
(2000), Evans and Leighton (1989), Parker (2009) Taylor (1996), Van Praag and Cramer 
(2001)). While recognising the limitations, ‘self-employed’ and ‘entrepreneur’ are used 
interchangeably in the discussion. 
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 One attribute of entrepreneurs for which there is accumulating evidence is that they 
overestimate the financial returns to starting a business (see Parker 2009 for a survey). For 
example, Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) find that the mean estimate by entrepreneurs 
of the probability that their own business will survive is well in excess of the mean realized 
probability. According to Landier and Thesmar (2009), entrepreneurs tend to overestimate 
employment expansion and sales growth. These studies do not, however, compare the 
optimism of entrepreneurs with the general population, leaving the question open as to 
whether higher optimism is really an intrinsic characteristic of those who choose self-
employment.1 Perhaps optimism is equally the province of those in paid employment. After 
all, optimism has been identified as one of the most widespread of behavioural biases (De 
Bondt and Thaler (1995, p. 389)).  
 
At first sight, cross-section studies, such as Arabsheibani et al. (2000), Puri and 
Robinson (2007, 2009), suggest that entrepreneurs do indeed have higher levels of optimism. 
The self-employed appear to over-estimate financial prospects as well as being optimistic 
over other domains including lifespan.2 Fraser and Greene (2006), using British data for the 
period 1984-99, find that the self-employed have higher income expectations than employees, 
but the difference diminishes with experience. However, despite using longitudinal data, they 
                                                                 
1 Optimism is taken here as forecasts biased in the favorable direction as opposed to overconfidence, interpreted 
as excessive forecast precision. (It is therefore logically possible to be an overconfident pessimist.) Hvide (2002) 
terms what we define as optimism, overconfidence1, and what we denote as overconfidence, as 
overconfidence2. According to Parker (2009), over-optimism refers to over-estimation of the probability of 
success, whereas over-confidence is under-estimation of the degree of variation in outcomes. Busenitz and 
Barney (1987) and Forbes (2005) measure overconfidence by examining the proportion of estimates to trivia 
questions, such as the length of the Nile, that fall outside self-assessed confidence intervals. Business founders 
are more confident than managers.  
2
 It is of course possible that entrepreneurs  really do live longer, because, for example, having to receive orders 
from others might be bad for life expectancy (Kuper and Marmot, 2003). 
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do not have data on income realizations, and therefore cannot rule out that expectation 
differences are justified.  
 
 Although these studies are of considerable interest, they do not address whether the 
observations arise because increased optimism is a consequence rather than a cause of 
entrepreneurship. Almost everyone may think that starting a successful business is more 
lucrative than it really is.3 On this view optimism is not a characteristic of the type of person 
attracted by entrepreneurship but the creation of the noisy, unpredictable environment in 
which the self-employed typically operate, for, as Kahneman et al. (1982) argue, optimism 
thrives under conditions of high uncertainty. Amongst reasons is the ‘planning fallacy’, 
identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). This is the tendency of people engaged in 
complex projects to regard best case scenarios as the most likely outcome. Explicit planning 
actually makes the problem worse, encouraging an ‘insider’ view which places greater weight 
on internal operational activity than on shocks originating in the external market. By contrast, 
‘outsiders’ place greater weight on typically realized performance, perhaps by paying closer 
attention to external information about actual realizations of other entrepreneurs. Consistent 
with this, Cassar (2010) finds that business start-ups which have gone through a formal 
planning process have the least realistic forecasts. Entrepreneurs as insiders in an uncertain 
environment, where illusions of control flourish and complex planning is required, may be 
located in an optimism incubator.  
 
                                                                 
3
 Astebro (2003) finds inventors have very negative expected returns. Nevertheless, t hey persist in seeking 
commercialization even after receiving credible external advice against doing so  (Astebro et al., 2007). The 
latter studies also finds inventors score higher on tests of optimistic attitudes than do the general population. 
These results are distinctly interesting, though for present purposes subject to qualification. Inventors may be 
extreme, forecast errors are not measured and it is possible beliefs are adopted post commitment as forecasts.   
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 One way to address the question of whether entrepreneurial optimism is acquired or a 
prior trait is to compare the financial optimism of people in paid employment who never 
become self-employed (hereafter ‘nevers’) with those currently in paid employment who 
subsequently become self-employed (hereafter ‘futures’), those in their last period in wage 
employment (so the forecast is for the first period of self-employment) (‘switchers-in’), and 
those in their last year of self-employment (‘switchers-out’) or have been self-employed in 
the past (‘pasts’). These groups further contrast with those currently in a spell of self-
employment which has lasted for one than one year and which will last for at least one further 
year (‘selfs’) Since measurements of forecasts and realizations are taken in a common 
environment, differences should reflect dispositional financial optimism. 
 
 There is however an important qualification to this conclusion. If the transition into 
self-employment is the result of a history of disappointing outcomes in paid employment, 
futures may be recorded as relatively optimistic in the sense that their forecast errors are 
higher than average. But this is the consequence of rational learning (in the spirit of 
Jovanovic, 1982) rather than of heterogeneous psychology. Although rational expectations 
imply that the expected forecast error is zero irrespective of individual characteristics and 
history, this does not mean that the expected error conditional on future decisions is zero. 
Suppose, for example, that everyone initially enters paid employment believing they will 
most likely earn the average of those with the same educational background and other 
observable characteristics. An individual doing worse faces a signal extraction problem. A 
poor realization could be the consequence of a bad draw or may be because (unobservable) 
intrinsic ability is below average for those with similar observables.4 If learning is rational, a 
                                                                 
4
 A number of studies have discussed this issue (see, for example, Gervais and Od ean, 2001; Camerer and 
Lovallo, 1999; Cassar and Craig, 2009). Studies suggest, from experimental and other evidence, that individuals 
are not particularly good at extracting underlying signals of ability from noisy information on forecast 
performance, and may display self-justification bias. 
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run of poor realizations should lead to a downward revision of the ability prior and hence of 
expectations. It may then be worth trying a different way of earning a living, such as self-
employment. According to this explanation, the prior optimism of futures is associated with 
worse realizations and forecasts that are no better than those of nevers and gradually become 
worse.5 If decision making is rational, post-transition into self-employment, the expected 
forecast error would be zero.6  
 
 In summary, if those entering self-employment are characterised by greater prior 
intrinsic optimism, two features should be present. First, those who will be self-employed in 
the future should over forecast their returns relative to those who will never be self-
employed. Second, if this apparent optimism is not (entirely) due to rational learning, the 
future self-employed should have significantly higher expectations, not just lower 
realizations. Both of these features readily lend themselves to empirical investigation with 
appropriate longitudinal data. 
 
3. Data source and descriptive analysis 
 
 The data is from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is a nationally 
representative general purpose survey funded by the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council, and similar in structure to the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the German 
Socio-Economic Panel. A stratified random cluster sample of households is drawn from the 
                                                                 
5
 An alternative rational learning story is that someone who enjoys a good realization run concludes that they are 
better than average and decides, in the absence of a better paid employment match, to become self-employed as 
returns are more closely attuned to ability. This though implies that futures would be recorded as less optimistic 
than nevers. 
6 If expectations are rational the unconditional forecast error of those with worse past realizations should be 
zero. In fact the data used in this paper reject this strongly. Furthermore, the unconditional error of those 
entering self employment should be zero. 
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population of British household postal addresses in Great Britain.7 The original sample of 
5000 households (approximately 12000 individuals) was recruited in 1991, and follow-on 
rules are established to track newly forming households involving originally-enumerated 
household members.8 The survey instrument is a questionnaire involving a household section, 
and individual sections, covering a range of topics including economic activity and finances, 
administered to all adult household members (including new household members at each 
wave). Repeat interviews take place annually, with 18 annual waves currently available to 
researchers.  
 
 Self-employment in the UK is defined by tax status – that is, registered with the tax 
authority as an own-account worker or business owner with approval to pay income tax (and 
social security contributions) through an end of year assessment, rather than through the UK 
‘pay-as-you-earn’ (PAYE) system. The BHPS asks individuals to self-report their 
employment status, thus identifying self-employment on this basis. Switchers and futures are 
identified by those who report that their full-time or main economic status changes. 
Switchers-in and –out are those who report a transition into or out of self-employment 
between the present and the next year. Futures are those who report further in the future a 
change into self-employment.9 Those who never enter self-employment are identified as 
nevers. 
 
                                                                 
7
 The far north of Scotland is excluded because of the prohibitive sampling costs. The original survey excludes 
Northern Ireland. Booster samples for Wales and Scotland recruited in 1999 and a sample for Northern Ireland 
recruited in 2001 are excluded from the analysis. 
8
 Sample attrition rates in the BHPS are generally low and certainly comparable to those achieved in other 
similar household panels. As is typical with household panels the highest attrition rate of individuals was 
between Waves 1 and 2 (12%). Attrition between Waves 2 and 3 was 7% of the original individuals and 
subsequently averaged 2.4% of the original sample between waves. In common with nearly all previously 
published research using this data source, attrition is assumed to be a random event. 
9
 A small number of transitions into part-time self-employment alongside full-time or part-time paid 
employment are excluded from the futures and switchers groups. 
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 From Wave 8 of the survey (1998/9) onwards, all economically active adults are 
asked about their entrepreneurial aspirations as part of the following question: 
‘I am going to read out a list of things which you may or may not want to 
happen to your current employment situation. For each one can you please 
tell me whether you would like this to happen to you in the next twelve 
months. Would you like to … start up your own business (a new business)?’ 
Aspires are identified as those currently in paid employment who in the year of forecast 
answer in the affirmative; non-aspires are those who answer in the negative. This question is 
specifically about start-ups so accords with narrow definitions of entrepreneurship. 
 
 The BHPS allows individual optimism to be investigated by information contained 
within two questions asked of all individuals in each year. These are:  
‘Looking ahead, how do you think you yourself will be financially a year from 
now; better than you are now, worse than you are now, or about the same?’ 
(forecast) 
and 
‘Would you say that you yourself are better off, worse off or about the same 
financially than you were a year ago?’ (realization)  
Matching the first question asked at year t with the second question asked at year t+1 
provides forecast and the realization of that forecast.  
 
 What subjects understand by being well off financially is not straightforward. A 
further question asks subjects to attribute the main reason for the change. For those with 
improved realizations, 67% report that an earnings increase is the main reason, followed by 
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12% who report a fall in outgoings. There is a close match between nevers and futures but for 
selfs only 63% name earnings as the main factor. For those experiencing worse realizations, 
49% report that the reason is higher outgoings, whereas 29% report lower earnings. Again, 
futures and nevers are very similar but 41% of selfs report lower earnings and 35% higher 
outgoings. In judging intrinsic optimism, the source of the change in finances is not obviously 
relevant. In assessing whether experiencing self-employment affects optimism, it is earnings 
changes that really matter. Brown and Taylor (2006) compare responses to these questions 
with real and nominal changes in actual income. The results reassuringly report consistency 
between an individual’s forecasting accuracy and the actual changes in their financial 
situation, and suggest that individual perceptions square with what happens to actual 
finances. 
 
 To the extent that the realization report is a noisy measure of income change, it will 
be harder to detect optimism change associated with status transitions. It is not obvious that 
personal expenses should fluctuate more for the self-employed so changes in optimism when 
people move status is likely to reflect changes in their income assessment. As on the upside 
income changes are reported as less important for selfs and on the downside more important. 
This suggests that our subsequent analysis is likely to underestimate how optimism changes 
when people become self-employed. 
 
 Tables 1a and 1b provide descriptive statistics on the BHPS data. Means and standard 
deviations are reported for available individual-year observations on two sample partitions: 
firstly aspires and non-aspires, and secondly futures, switchers-in, selfs, switchers-out, pasts 
and nevers. The financial forecasts of futures exceed the nevers but realizations are rather 
similar. Selfs have higher forecasts than futures but also lower realizations. Aspires have 
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higher expectations than non-aspires but also better outcomes. As in Das and van Soest 
(1997), Arabsheibani et al. (2000) Souleles (2004) and Balasuriya, Muradoglu, and Ayton 
(2010), forecasts and realizations may be cardinalized on three-point scales from which a 
five-point measure of forecast error can be constructed. A natural approach to determine 
whether optimism differs between groups is to compare this error. Note that the mean 5-point 
scale forecast error is in the optimistic direction for all groups but non-aspires and nevers are 
the least optimistic by some way, followed by switchers out, pasts, futures, switchers-in, 
aspires, and selfs.10 The rest of the paper investigates whether this optimism ranking can be 
taken at face value.  
 
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
 The remainder of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for a set of control covariates 
which will be used in the econometric analysis: age, gender, marital status and highest 
education. It is of note that aspires and futures tend to be slightly younger, and that non-
aspires and nevers are much more likely to be female, reflecting the lower proportion of 
women amongst the stock of self-employed in the UK. Educational attainment is captured in 
the analysis through a series of dummy variables indicating the highest level of attainment. 
These are: university or college degree level at undergraduate or postgraduate level; other 
non-degree higher education including some historic teaching qualifications and nursing 
qualifications; A-levels or equivalent (post-compulsory examinations taken at 18 as 
qualifying exams for college or university entrance), GCSE or O-levels (age 16 schooling 
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 Nevers are identified as never being self-employed during the sample period. Some may enter self-
employment later, in which case the tendency is to under record the extent of the optimism difference  with 
futures. 
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attainment qualifications); and no formal qualifications. Nevers are less likely to have higher 
educational qualifications. 
 
4. Econometric strategy 
 
Denote  ’s forecast at     of their income at   as     and the realization at   as    . 
Initially, suppose both are continuous variables. Defining forecast error as            , 
the rational expectation,  ̅  , satisfies      ̅       where     is a random error with mean 
zero reflecting the various shocks that can intervene between the forecast and realization. It 
therefore follows that           ̅       . Forecast error is an unbiased but noisy estimate 
of optimism. The central test therefore appears to be whether the mean forecast error of 
futures significantly differs from nevers.  
 
In the present context, there are three problems with this procedure; 
i)  Suppose that individuals learn about their productivity over time. Initially, they 
assume that they resemble their peers and so forecast average returns. As 
experience flows in, individuals update their estimate of their intrinsic ability. 
This involves a signal extraction problem. A poor realization may be bad luck or 
reflect low ability so it is rational to downgrade expectations. Those experiencing 
a run of poor realizations will therefore be recorded as optimists. After a while, 
they downgrade their expected returns in paid employment by so much they try 
self-employment. On average, futures are therefore measured as optimistic 
relative to nevers, despite both groups being equally rational. The potential 
problem is that futures are created by subsequent forecast error. In effect, the label 
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is awarded for being an optimist. This rational learning possibility can though be 
rejected if futures have significantly higher realizations.11 
 
It is worth making the rational learning issue explicit with a stylized illustration. 
Let there be equal numbers of two types of risk-neutral people, As and Bs. If an A 
enters paid employment they earn 100 whereas a B earns 50. In self-employment, 
both types have expected earnings of 60. At the outset people do not know their 
type. Everyone is risk neutral and has rational expectations. A working life 
comprises two periods. In the first, everyone chooses paid-employment in which 
expected earnings are 75, exceeding the 60 in self-employment. As earnings in 
paid-employment reveal type, in the second period all Bs switch to self-
employment and all As remain in paid-employment. When asked to forecast 
income, subjects report expected value.  Measured by forecast error, futures are 
therefore all optimists and nevers are pessimists, despite everyone having rational 
expectations. Come the second round, everyone is a realist.  
 
Note that the problem identified here does not arise with aspires because the 
classification is made simultaneously with the forecast rather than retrospectively. 
  
ii) As realizations may be subject to large idiosyncratic shocks they are noisy 
estimates of bias. Detecting between-group differences in optimism may therefore 
be difficult. There is a better way. Define a new error measure,    ̅̅ ̅̅        ̅̅ ̅ 
where   ̅̅ ̅ is the mean realization of the group to which the individual belongs. It 
                                                                 
11
 The mirror case is if people do better than average, upgrade their estimate of their ability and then switch to 
self-employment where they believe reward is more closely related to ability. Rational learning of this sort 
makes futures appear relative pessimists but this is not observed in our data. 
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follows that averaged over the group,     equals    ̅̅ ̅̅ , but the latter has lower 
variance if                  . This inequality certainly holds if forecasts are 
random or if the variation in realizations is mostly due to random shocks. In 
effect, the      measure assumes the rational expectation is the actual realization 
and    ̅̅ ̅̅  assumes that the appropriate forecast is the group mean. The difference 
does not affect the point estimate of bias but its precision.    ̅̅ ̅̅  is normally the 
appropriate measure if the objective is to detect differences in bias between 
groups. 
 
iii)  When the forecast error procedure is applied to categorical data of the type in the 
present data, a potential data truncation bias arises. If a five-point measure of 
forecast error is constructed, it can then be tested whether the mean of this 
measure differs between groups. To illustrate why this can give rise to misleading 
results, suppose that for futures the most likely outcome is better, so this is their 
rational forecast. Nevertheless, because outcomes are stochastic, same and worse 
are sometimes realized. On average, futures will therefore be recorded as 
optimists. Similarly, nevers may rationally predict worse in which case they will 
be measured as pessimists on average. It may therefore be falsely concluded that 
futures are significantly more optimistic than nevers despite both having rational 
expectations. 
 
 To avoid these three problems, an alternative procedure is followed. An ordered 
probit is run of expectations at t on employment status dummies (with nevers as the excluded 
variable) and other time varying and invariant variables of interest. To take into account that 
differences in expectations may be rational rather than due to optimism, a performance 
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control is included. This is created by computing the fitted values from a fixed-effect 
regression of realization at     on time-varying employment status dummies, past 
realizations age and year dummies.12 The procedure is a more sophisticated version of using 
the group mean, as discussed in ii) to estimate the rational expectation. The primary interest 
is in the employment status variables.  
 
 A number of specific points should be made concerning this procedure. At the 
second-stage, the role of the fitted values is as a control. If everyone is equally optimistic, all 
those with the same fitted value should make the same forecast, therefore the difference in 
forecast by group measures relative optimism. Although the fitted variables control for 
rational expectations, because of the categorical data, the only restriction imposed by 
rationality is this coefficient should not be negative.13 
 
 Forecast is not included at the first-stage. Its inclusion potentially creates bias. Say 
that futures have on average lower fixed effects. Also, performance is increasing in 
expectations (as will be true if forecasts have some rationality). It follows by construction 
that at any given level of predicted performance, the nevers must have higher average 
expectations. At the second stage, the futures would therefore be found to be more optimistic, 
but this is an artefact of the procedure when futures are included at the first-stage.14  
                                                                 
12
 The problems with nonlinear fixed effects models (e.g. Greene (2004)) lead us to use a linear formulation 
albeit that the cardinalization that outcomes involve equal increments is somewhat arbitrary. 
 
13
 Suppose two groups. The best performers have a 40% chance of better 30% same and 30% worse. Their 
expected performance on a 1,0,-1 scale is 0.1. All these types rationally forecast better. The worst performers 
have a 30% chance of better 30% same and 40% worse. Their expected performance on a 1,0,-1 scale is -0.1 
and all of them rationally forecast worse. So a change of 0.2 in performance generates a change in forecast of 2, 
a coefficient of 10. If the two groups had chance of better of 40% and 50% performance differs but not forecast, 
so the coefficient would be zero. 
14
 Adding forecasts to the first stage has negligible effect on its explanatory power and the fitted values. 
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 In the case of futures, there is a problem in drawing conclusions concerning their 
relative optimism if this group has lower realizations than nevers (as revealed by the average 
first-stage fixed effects of the groups). Under these circumstances the optimism of the futures 
could be due to rational learning. There are ways round this. If the apparent optimism of 
futures is due to rational learning that their ability is relatively low, inclusion of lagged 
realizations at the first stage should at least in part control for this. People with same history 
should draw the same conclusions about their ability and therefore display the same measured 
optimism even if learning is present. Second, if the optimism of futures is due to learning, 
their expectations should not be significantly higher than nevers. So when testing for the 
relative optimism of futures, the procedure is supplemented with a separate test of 
expectations. If futures are more optimistic according to the two-stage test and their 
expectations are higher, their intrinsic optimism is higher.15 
 
 The Appendix presents alternative methods of estimating differences in optimism and 
discusses their merits and drawbacks. All procedures yield similar conclusions.  
 
5. Results 
 
 Table 2 reports the first stage of the procedure, the fixed effect regressions used to 
control for possible performance differences between groups. Column (1) compares aspires 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
15
 Separately estimating the expectation and realization equations is more straightforward than using the two-
stage procedure. The problem is if it is impossible to reject that futures or some other optimistic group perform 
better. This issue is further discussed in the Appendix.  
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with non-aspires and shows that there is no significant difference in the financial realizations 
of the two groups. Column (2) compares groups on the basis of current and future 
employment status. Switchers-out have the highest realizations, and the difference is 
statistically significant. They are followed in order by pasts and selfs. There is a positive 
effect of previous realization on current realization, as indicated by the negative coefficients 
on same and worse.16 To measure inter-group performance differences, the fixed effects are 
retrieved and regressed on the time-invariant group dummies with standard errors 
bootstrapped. Results for this are reported in Table 3. These results show that aspires perform 
significantly better than non-aspires (column 1) and nevers perform significantly better than 
futures (column 2). 
 
TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
 
 Optimism estimates are reported in Table 4 where the rational expectation control is 
the fitted values of the first-stage realization equation.17 Standard errors are bootstrapped and 
are clustered in order to take account of multiple observations per individual. The coefficients 
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 The regressions in Table 2 include a lagged dependent variable, albeit in a categorical form. In panel data, 
where the number of time observations is particularly low, there is the possibility of bias in the coefficient 
estimates. However in the present case the average number of observations  per individual is 7. Furthermore the 
purpose of the model in Table 2 is to provide estimates of realizations rather than inference, and to test 
differences in averages between groups. There is no reason to believe that any bias would affect particular 
groups differently. 
17
 Alternative specifications such as entering the fitted values in quadratic form to allow for non linear effects, 
the inclusion of interaction terms hardly affect the final optimism estimates, so for ease of interpretatio n the 
simpler form is reported. 
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on the various time-varying and invariant variables indicate differential optimism.18 Marginal 
effects on the probability of forecasting better and worse are also reported. 
 
TABLE 4 NEAR HERE 
 
 Our primary concern is with differences in optimism between the different sample 
groups. However, before these are discussed, we briefly describe other significant optimism 
effects, revealed in the other covariate coefficient estimates that are incidental to the main 
themes of the paper. Firstly optimism declines with age. Secondly men are significantly more 
optimistic than women. This supports previous research (Puri and Robinson, 2007; 
Arabsheibani et al. 2000). Again, although statistically significant, the effect is not large. 
Thirdly being married is associated with lower optimism, supporting previous cross-sectional 
research. The magnitude of this effect is almost exactly the same in size, but with the 
opposite sign, as that for males. So unmarried males are most optimistic; married females are 
least optimistic. Fourthly a higher level of educational attainment is associated with lower 
optimism. Coefficient estimates vary somewhat across the reported specifications. Generally 
speaking someone with a university degree or college diploma (HND/HNC) reports lower 
forecast than someone with no educational qualifications. Lower levels of educational 
attainment are generally not statistically significant. Finally, optimism is higher following a 
good realization in the previous period, as indicated by the significant negative coefficient 
estimates at the foot of the table on the ‘same’ and ‘worse’ realization. This is consistent with 
                                                                 
18
 An alternative procedure runs fixed-effects regressions at both stages, retrieves the second stage fixed effects 
and then runs them on the group dummies. This yields very similar results. Finally, a pooled first -stage probit 
can be run at the first-stage to generate rational expectation probabilities to be used as controls in a second -stage 
expectation probit. Again, results are similar. 
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people attributing success to their own skill and failure to bad luck (Langer and Roth, 1975). 
Experiencing success encourages hubris. 
 
 The second-stage equations show strong evidence that expectations are at least 
qualitatively rational in the sense that those with most reason to have above average forecasts 
according to the first-stage equation, are actually more likely to have higher forecasts.19 
 
 The main focus of the paper involves comparison of optimism by employment status 
and aspirations. According to Model 1a of Table 4, nevers are significantly less optimistic 
than all other groups. As futures have significantly worse realizations than nevers, according 
to Table 3, their apparent optimism could be due to rational learning. If this were the case, 
futures should not have significantly higher expectations than nevers when the rational 
expectation control is dropped. Model 2a shows this is not the case, so it can be concluded 
that their optimism is not entirely down to rational learning. 20  
 
 Previous studies have found that the self-employed are more optimistic about their 
financial prospects than employees. The financial optimism of the self-employed is therefore 
not (entirely) a consequence of being self-employed but in some measure is a dispositional 
trait. From Model 1b of Table 4, employees who aspire to start a business are more optimistic 
than those who do not, again indicating that intrinsic optimism is a factor in self-employment. 
People who later become self-employed display more optimism whilst still in paid 
                                                                 
19
 Due to the categorical data, rational expectations do not imply that the coefficient on the fitted values is unity. 
An increase in expected performance may not justify any increase in the most likely outcome or a large change.  
20
 For most variables the coefficients in these equations are similar to the expectation without the performance 
control. This reflects the low coefficient on the performance control and the relatively small performance 
differences. Expectation differences are a good measure of optimism but this can only be determined by doing 
the two-stage exercise. 
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employment than those who never become self-employed. Those who express an aspiration to 
start a business are also more optimistic.  
 
 The next important issue is how optimism changes as people move in and out of self-
employment. From Table 4 Model 1a, entrants to self-employment, the self-employed, those 
leaving self-employment and employees who have been self-employed in the past are all 
significantly more optimistic than nevers. That returners to paid employment are more 
optimistic is further evidence that intrinsic optimism is a factor in self-employment. 
Switchers-in are more optimistic than futures but the difference is not significant, possibly 
because there are relatively few entrant observations. Selfs are more optimistic than futures at 
the 1% level. There is evidence that the financial optimism of futures is greater when they are 
self-employed.  
 
Magnitudes are not small. The probability of a self forecasting better is some 38% 
higher than a never given both are equally likely to experience better and share the same 
observable characteristics. Before becoming self-employed, the difference is some 10%. 
Figure 1 shows that the absolute probabilities of forecasting better and worse of individuals 
with the mean characteristics of the total sample (including likely performance) but differing 
in employment status or self-employment aspiration.21 As noted, futures are more optimistic 
than nevers, with optimism further increasing as self-employment is entered. Optimism peaks 
for those established in self-employment, diminishing when exit occurs, with those who have 
been self-employed having about the same optimism margin as prior to their entry. 
 
                                                                 
21
 The marginal probabilities of Models 1a and 1b are evaluated at the sample means with the status dummies 
set to zero except for the category of interest.  
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 The most obvious explanation why futures and aspires are more optimistic 
concerning their financial prospects than those who remain in paid employment and are 
happy to do so, follows de Meza and Southey (1996). Optimists are attracted by activities that 
encourage optimism. For example, individual i's expected return in activity   is            
where    is an index of I’s optimism,    the optimism “capacity” of occupation   and    is the 
true return. Defining     as the difference in the expected return to two activities,   and  , 
     
      
      . Optimists are characterised by high relative attraction to the activity with 
provides most fertile conditions for encouraging that optimism. This potentially explains why 
optimism is higher for futures but it implies that their optimism would become greater still 
when they become self-employed. As noted, there is some evidence that this is the case. 
 
 In this analysis optimism matters only because it influences the perception of 
economic variables. It is possible that optimism is associated with other personality traits that 
involve a taste for self-employment. Consider ‘sensation seeking’ defined by Zukerman 
(1994) as “a trait defined by the need for varied, novel, and complex sensations and 
experiences and the willingness to take physical and social risks for the sake of such 
experiences.” (p.27) A taste for novelty may be associated with a propensity to give self-
employment a go. Nicolaou et al. (2008) find that this characteristic is heritable and 
entrepreneurs are indeed more likely to have it. In addition, Horvath and Zuckerman (1993) 
show that sensation seekers underestimate risk. So there is the possibility that the optimism of 
the self-employed is not a cause of optimism but a side product of the true driver, sensation 
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seeking. This could be why the financial optimism of the self-employed is not detectably 
higher than when they were in paid employment.22  
 
 Whether or not sensation seeking plays a role in explaining the relation between 
optimism and self-employment, the finding that optimism precedes self-employment has 
important efficiency implications. Entry due to financial misperception depends on the 
difference in the optimism applied to paid and self-employment and that is certainly less than 
cross section estimates suggest. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 This paper has sought to disentangle the extent to which optimism is a trait 
predisposing individuals towards self-employment or is a creation of the excitement and 
intensity that is typically involved in venturing a business. Previous research has established 
contemporaneous association between over-optimism and self-employment, but, by largely 
restricting analysis to cross-sectional data, it fails to establish whether over-optimism is a 
latent characteristic of the future self-employed. Longitudinal data is used to construct 
derived measures of latent optimism prior to any decision about transition into self-
employment.  
 
                                                                 
22 Some suggestive evidence is that sensation seekers tend to be smokers (Zuckerman, Ball, 
Black, 1990) and, using the BHPS data, we found a strong positive correlation between 
smoking and financial optimism. 
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A first key finding is that those who will become self-employed in the future are more 
optimistic whilst in paid employment than those who will never work for themselves. This 
finding is robust to a series of investigations about the most appropriate method of 
measurement. Consistently with this conclusion, employees who aspire to self-employment 
overestimate their returns by more than those who have no such aspirations. As the desire to 
start a business is expressed prior to the measurement of optimism, the explanation for this 
result cannot be rational learning. There is strong evidence that the prior dispositional 
optimism of the self-employed is above average.  
 
 The second key finding is that people become even more optimistic when self-
employed. Working for yourself does appear to foster optimism. The cross-sectional 
difference in the optimism of the self-employed and the paid employed is therefore 
attributable to both selection and treatment effects. This is a clue to why self-employment 
attracts optimists. The scope for wishful thinking concerning how well a new business will do 
plausibly exceeds the opportunity to fantasize about the returns to continuing in paid 
employment. Natural optimists will therefore exaggerate the difference in returns between 
self-employment and paid employment, so it is plausible that a track record of optimism in 
paid employment predicts future self-employment.  
 
It is tempting to conclude from this that entry into self-employment may be excessive. 
To the extent that optimism affects the assessment of the returns to both paid and self-
employment, the existence of optimism bias may not give rise to such distorted entry 
decisions as may initially appear.23 As the cross-sectional optimism difference is partly a 
selection effect, the self-employed also overestimated returns to paid employment. Entry into 
                                                                 
23
 The fact that 30% of those entering self-employment exit within a year does though indicate error may be 
involved (Henley 2007). 
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self-employment is only due to mistaken financial expectations to the extent optimism is 
lower in paid employment. Cross-section comparisons of the optimism of employees and the 
self-employed exaggerate the extent of the bias. 
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Appendix  
 
 Alternative methods of comparing the optimism of the various groups are reviewed 
here and the corresponding estimates presented. All find that futures are significantly more 
optimistic than nevers but evidence that the optimism of futures changes when they enter 
self-employment is weaker.  
 
 A natural procedure is to separately estimate the expectation and realization 
equations. If the group of interest have significantly higher expectations but lower 
realizations it is more optimistic. Call this method M1. The problem is that unless it can be 
ruled out that the realizations of the high expectation group are not better no conclusion can 
be drawn. This is due to the categorical data. If in one group everyone correctly estimates the 
probabilities of worse is 40% and the others as 30% each, they all forecast worse. In another 
group the probabilities of better is 40% with the other outcomes 30% each, so all forecast 
better. The expected outcomes only differ by 0.2 but the expectations by 2. At first sight, the 
second group is more optimistic, but this is an artefact of the categorical data.  
 
 To see whether the combinations that allow conclusions to be drawn apply in this data 
(augmented to include subjects not observed in paid employment), pooled probit realization 
and expectation regressions including employment status dummies are run. Table A1 reports 
the result. A one-tailed test rejects that futures have better realizations. As the expectation 
equation shows that futures have higher expectations, it can be concluded that they are more 
optimistic than nevers. For aspires and other groups, M1 is not applicable. 
 
 The second method, M2, involves the construction of forecast errors. Forecasts and 
realizations are coded on a three point scale thereby creating a five point forecast error scale. 
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As discussed in the text, there is a potential truncation error if the group found to be more 
optimistic has better realizations. From Table A2a, this property does not apply to futures 
relative to nevers so the very significant optimism difference between these two groups in 
Table A2b can be taken at face value.24 Aspires do not have significantly different 
realizations to non-aspires (Table A1). It therefore cannot be ruled out that the relative 
optimism of the aspires in Table A2a is due to truncation bias. 
  
 A third method, M3, estimates realization conditional on forecast, controls and group 
dummies with nevers the excluded group. If every group was equally optimistic the 
distribution of outcomes would be the same given the forecast, so if a dummy is significantly 
negative, that group is relatively optimistic. M3 estimates realization conditional on forecast 
whereas the text method, M4, estimates forecast conditional on rational expectation. These 
procedures are not of equal power. Consider an extreme illustration. Suppose that everyone 
basis expectations on irrelevant factors. So there is no correlation between forecasts and 
realizations. Nevertheless futures have higher expectations than nevers, but there is no 
significant difference between the groups in the determination of realizations. In this case M4 
finds that given expected realization, futures have higher expectations; so are more 
optimistic. In contrast, M3 wrongly concludes there is no difference in optimism between the 
groups. Although futures are more likely to forecast better, whichever group such a forecast 
comes from, there will be no difference in the expected outcome. So M3 is a less direct and 
reliable estimator of optimism than M4.25 Nevertheless, Tables A3a and A3b show that  
                                                                 
24
 An alternative procedure to compare forecast errors by status  is first to estimate a fixed-effect model with 
transition dummies, test for their significance and then test whether the fixed effects of futures significantly 
exceed those of nevers. Results are consistent with those of Table A2b, strongly indicating that optimism is both 
a cause and consequence of self-employment but subject to the same potential truncation bias.  
25
 Suppose that the expectation formation process is                  where     are factors unrelated to the 
rational expectation and    is an optimism index. If two groups have the same distribution of     and      but 
differ in their distribution of optimism then M4 measures the difference in mean   . The mean change in R 
required to preserve   when optimism is higher (what M3 measures) depends on the nature of the   function 
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futures are significantly more optimistic than nevers and aspires more optimistic than non-
aspires. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
and the joint distribution of   and   so will not necessarily equal the mean difference in  . Consider the 
following stylised example. Subjects must decide whether they are a G or B. knowing there are equal numbers 
of both types in the population. A ball is drawn with your letter on it but it's hard to read. An unbiased expert is 
hired to decipher the letter. An assessment is written specifying the most likely letter that is correct 75% of the 
time. A realist accepts the report’s conclusion. A super optimist reviews the reports and converts Bs to Gs. So 
for the optimist, 50% of claimed Gs really are. This is not so different to the realist’s 50%. If the expert is 
always right optimism causes the accuracy of the forecast to fall from 100% to 50% but if the expert is no bette r 
than random optimism has no effect on the forecast conditional outcome. 
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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics 
    Aspires Non-Aspires 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Financial forecasts and 
realizations 
     
Financial forecast (t):      
 Better off Reference category 0.473 0.499 0.342 0.474 
 Same  0.450 0.498 0.581 0.493 
 Worse off  0.077 0.267 0.077 0.266 
 3 point scale  
 (dependent variable) 
-1 if individual financial forecast 
‘worse off’, 0 if ‘same’ and 1 if 
‘better off’ at t 0.396 0.627 0.265 0.590 
Financial realization 
(t+1): 
 
    
 Better off Reference category 0.392 0.488 0.340 0.474 
 Same   0.366 0.482 0.456 0.498 
 Worse off  0.242 0.428 0.204 0.403 
 3 point scale  
 (dependent variable) 
-1 if individual realized ‘worse 
off’, 0 if ‘same’ and 1 if ‘better 
off’ at t+1 0.150 0.782 0.136 0.725 
Financial realization 
(t): 
 
    
 Better off Reference category 0.407 0.491 0.380 0.485 
 Same   0.365 0.481 0.440 0.496 
 Worse off  0.229 0.420 0.180 0.384 
 3 point scale  
 
-1 if individual realised ‘worse 
off’, 0 if ‘same’ and 1 if ‘better 
off’ at t 0.178 0.777 0.199 0.721 
Forecast error:      
  5 point scale 
 (dependent variable) 
Range from  -2 to +2 (Forecast t  
minus Realization  t+1) 0.246 0.897 0.129 0.815 
 
Demographics      
 Age Years 35.59 10.42 39.46 12.14 
 Age squared  1375.2 786.8 1704.7 1001.5 
 Male  0.628 0.483 0.472 0.499 
Marital Status      
 Married  0.486 0.500 0.582 0.493 
 Cohabiting  0.233 0.423 0.163 0.370 
 Widowed/divorced 
 /separated 
 
0.075 0.263 0.079 0.270 
 Single, never married Reference category 
0.206 0.404 0.175 0.380 
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Educational Attainment      
 University degree  0.181 0.385 0.181 0.385 
 Other higher education  0.092 0.289 0.077 0.267 
 A-levels  0.223 0.417 0.224 0.417 
 O-Levels/GCSE's  0.378 0.485 0.364 0.481 
 No qualifications Reference category 0.126 0.332 0.154 0.361 
Number of individual-year observations in each group: 3688 28237 
Number of individuals: 1935 6443 
 
Definitions: Aspires: those currently in paid employment who state a desire to start a business 
in the next 12 months; Non-aspires: those currently in paid employment who do not. 
Source: authors tabulations from BHPS 1991-2008. 
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Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics 
  Nevers Futures Switchers In Selfs Switchers Out Pasts 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Financial forecasts 
and realizations 
             
Financial forecast 
(t): 
             
 Better off Reference 
category 0.340 0.474 0.418 0.493 0.428 0.495 0.411 0.492 0.433 0.496 0.351 0.477 
 Same  0.559 0.496 0.479 0.500 0.466 0.499 0.525 0.499 0.492 0.500 0.575 0.494 
 Worse off  0.101 0.301 0.103 0.304 0.106 0.308 0.064 0.245 0.075 0.263 0.074 0.262 
 3 point scale  
 (dependent 
variable) 
-1 if individual 
financial forecast 
‘worse off’, 0 if 
‘same’ and 1 if 
‘better off’ at t 0.239 0.619 0.315 0.649 0.322 0.657 0.347 0.596 0.358 0.617 0.276 0.591 
Financial 
realization (t+1): 
 
            
 Better off Reference 
category 0.334 0.472 0.366 0.482 0.374 0.484 0.308 0.462 0.391 0.488 0.320 0.467 
 Same   0.433 0.495 0.368 0.482 0.349 0.477 0.475 0.499 0.417 0.493 0.466 0.499 
 Worse off  0.233 0.423 0.266 0.442 0.277 0.448 0.216 0.412 0.192 0.394 0.214 0.410 
 3 point scale  
 (dependent 
variable) 
-1 if individual 
realized ‘worse 
off’, 0 if ‘same’ 
and 1 if ‘better 
off’ at t+1 0.102 0.746 0.099 0.789 0.097 0.802 0.092 0.718 0.199 0.738 0.106 0.723 
Financial 
realization (t): 
 
            
 Better off Reference 
category 0.366 0.482 0.414 0.493 0.331 0.471 0.347 0.476 0.321 0.467 0.360 0.480 
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 Same   0.424 0.494 0.351 0.477 0.424 0.495 0.443 0.497 0.417 0.493 0.460 0.498 
 Worse off  0.210 0.407 0.235 0.424 0.245 0.430 0.210 0.407 0.262 0.440 0.180 0.385 
 3 point scale  
 
-1 if individual 
realized ‘worse 
off’, 0 if ‘same’ 
and 1 if ‘better 
off’ at t+1 0.157 0.743 0.179 0.785 0.086 0.754 0.137 0.734 0.059 0.762 0.180 0.713 
Forecast error:              
  5 point scale 
 (dependent 
variable) 
Range from  -2 to 
+2 (Forecast t  
minus 
Realization  t+1) 0.138 0.837 0.216 0.900 0.225 0.905 0.254 0.834 0.160 0.865 0.171 0.845 
Demographics              
 Age Years 38.4 12.1 35.1 10.4 37.7 11.2 43.7 11.8 40.9 11.5 43.2 11.3 
 Age squared  1619.2 984.0 1340.5 772.4 1546.6 897.0 2048.3 1075.0 1801.7 998.8 1990.8 1035.8 
 Male  0.467 0.499 0.606 0.489 0.637 0.481 0.671 0.470 0.632 0.483 0.639 0.480 
Marital Status              
 Married  0.589 0.492 0.541 0.498 0.568 0.496 0.663 0.473 0.640 0.480 0.693 0.461 
 Cohabiting  0.144 0.351 0.170 0.376 0.203 0.403 0.134 0.341 0.168 0.374 0.137 0.344 
 
Widowed/divorced 
 /separated 
 
0.079 0.270 0.056 0.231 0.067 0.249 0.076 0.264 0.070 0.255 0.084 0.278 
 Single, never 
married 
Reference 
category 0.188 0.391 0.233 0.423 0.162 0.369 0.127 0.333 0.122 0.328 0.085 0.280 
Educational 
Attainment 
 
            
 University degree  0.154 0.361 0.198 0.399 0.203 0.403 0.165 0.371 0.199 0.399 0.173 0.378 
 Other higher 
education 
 
0.075 0.264 0.091 0.287 0.079 0.270 0.074 0.261 0.098 0.297 0.091 0.287 
 A-levels  0.205 0.404 0.237 0.425 0.219 0.414 0.251 0.434 0.239 0.427 0.228 0.420 
 O-Levels/GCSE's  0.373 0.484 0.306 0.461 0.326 0.469 0.305 0.461 0.309 0.463 0.337 0.473 
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 No qualifications Reference 
category 0.192 0.394 0.168 0.374 0.173 0.378 0.206 0.404 0.155 0.362 0.171 0.377 
Number of individual-year  
observations in each group: 
51999 3700 876 2911 614 2102 
Number of individuals: 7697 780 726 809 553 524 
 
Definitions: Nevers – those who never choose self-employment; Futures – those currently in paid employment who become self-employed in the 
future; Switchers In – those in their last period of paid employment who will become self-employed in the next year; Selfs – those currently in 
self-employment whose spell has lasted for at least one year and will last for at least one further year; Switchers Out – those in their last period 
of self-employment who will switch out in the next year; Pasts – those currently in paid-employment who have been self-employed in the past. 
 
Source: authors tabulations from BHPS 1991-2008 
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Table 2: Fixed Effect Linear probability regression for financial realizations (first-stage 
equation) 
 
(1) 
Realization
s t+1  
(2) 
Realizations 
t+1  
Variable Coefficient P>z Coefficient P>z 
Aspires -0.011 0.529 - - 
Switchers In - - -0.019 0.608 
Selfs - - 0.060 0.024 
Switchers Out - - 0.159 0.000 
Pasts - - 0.079 0.014 
Demographics      
Age  0.003 0.895 0.019 0.184 
Financial Realizations time t 
(reference category: ‘better’)     
‘Same’ 0.044 0.000 -0.046 0.000 
‘Worse’ 0.111 0.000 -0.053 0.000 
Observations 31925  62202  
F test  
(p-value) 
22.12  
0.000  
15.57  
0.000  
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year dummy variables 
(coefficients not reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic 
below 0.05 
 
 
Table 3: Linear probability regression of fixed effects from Stage 1 (Table 2) 
 
(1*) 
Fixed Effects from (1) 
(2*) 
Fixed Effects from (2) 
Variable Coefficient P>z Coefficient P>z 
Aspires 0.0318 0.004 - - 
Nevers - - 0.0648 0.000 
Observations 31925 62202 
Chi2 8.29 18.72 
(p-value) 0.004 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.002 
Root MSE 0.458 0.511 
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered by individual. Italic indicates 
significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table 4: Ordered probit regressions for financial forecasts conditionals on predicted 
realizations (second-stage equation) 
 
 Model (1a): Forecast t 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Predicted financial 
realizations at t+1 0.636 0.000 0.232 0.000 -0.093 0.000 
Futures 0.098 0.002 0.036 0.002 -0.013 0.001 
Switchers In 0.156 0.002 0.059 0.003 -0.020 0.001 
Self-Employed 0.293 0.000 0.112 0.000 -0.035 0.000 
Switchers Out 0.199 0.000 0.075 0.001 -0.025 0.000 
Pasts 0.122 0.001 0.046 0.001 -0.017 0.000 
Choice threshold 
parameter 1 -2.234      
Choice threshold 
parameter 2 -0.401      
Log Likelihood -52975.3      
chi²  (p-value) 0.000      
Pseudo R² 0.077      
N 62202      
 Model (2a): Forecast t 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Futures 0.082 0.007 0.031 0.018 -0.012 0.012 
Switchers In 0.146 0.007 0.055 0.008 -0.020 0.003 
Self-Employed 0.293 0.000 0.112 0.000 -0.037 0.000 
Switchers Out 0.263 0.000 0.101 0.000 -0.034 0.000 
Pasts 0.123 0.000 0.046 0.001 -0.017 0.000 
Choice threshold 
parameter 1 -2.425      
Choice threshold 
parameter 2 -0.630      
Log Likelihood -53970.7      
chi²  (p-value) 0.000       
Pseudo R² 0.060       
N 62202       
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Table 4 (continued): 
 Model (1b): Forecast t 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Predicted financial 
realizations at t+1 0.551 0.000 0.203 0.000 -0.067 0.000 
Aspires 0.153 0.000 0.058 0.000 -0.017 0.000 
Choice threshold 
parameter 1 -2.307      
Choice threshold 
parameter 2 -0.368      
Log Likelihood -26211.4      
chi²  (p-value) 0.000       
Pseudo R² 0.075       
N 31925       
 Model (2b): Forecast t 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Aspires 0.141 0.000 0.053 0.000 -0.017 0.000 
Choice threshold 
parameter 1 -2.545      
Choice threshold 
parameter 2 -0.648      
Log Likelihood -26733.6      
chi²  (p-value) 0.000       
Pseudo R² 0.056       
N 31925       
 
Notes: Models (1a) and (1b) report standard errors that are bootstrapped and clustered by 
individual. Models (2a) and (2b) report clustered standard errors. All regressions include age, 
gender, marital status dummy variables, educational attainment dummy variables, financial 
realizations at time t and a set of year dummy variables (coefficients not reported but 
available on request). Bold italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.05 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1a: Ordered probit regression for financial realizations measured at time t+1 (M1) 
 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Aspires -0.024 0.280 -0.009 0.278 0.002 0.259 0.007 0.284 
         
Financial Realizations time t (reference category: ‘better’)         
‘Same’ -0.357 0.000 -0.129 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.101 0.000 
‘Worse’ -0.632 0.000 -0.207 0.000 0.005 0.025 0.202 0.000 
Choice threshold parameter 1 -1.426        
Choice threshold parameter 2 -0.166        
Log Likelihood -32538.1     
chi²  (p-value) 0.000        
Pseudo R² 0.033        
N 31925        
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include demographic and education controls, and year dummy variables (coefficients not 
reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table A1b: Ordered probit regression for financial realizations measured at time t+1 (M1) 
 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Futures -0.040 0.074 -0.014 0.071 0.002 0.041 0.012 0.078 
Switchers In -0.027 0.567 -0.010 0.565 0.002 0.531 0.008 0.571 
Selfs 0.022 0.188 0.008 0.190 -0.001 0.211 -0.007 0.185 
Switchers Out 0.123 0.001 0.045 0.002 -0.011 0.012 -0.035 0.001 
Pasts 0.051 0.014 0.019 0.015 -0.004 0.028 -0.015 0.012 
         
Financial Realizations time t (reference category:  ‘better’)         
‘Same’ -0.358 0.000 -0.127 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.109 0.000 
‘Worse’ -0.666 0.000 -0.214 0.000 -0.009 0.000 0.223 0.000 
Choice threshold parameter 1 -1.231        
Choice threshold parameter 2 -0.015        
Log Likelihood -70459.3       
chi²  (p-value) 0.000        
Pseudo R² 0.040        
N 68659        
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include demographic and education controls, and year dummy variables (coefficients not 
reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table A1c: Ordered probit regression for financial forecasts measured at time t (M1) 
 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Aspires 0.145 0.000 0.055 0.000 -0.038 0.000 -0.017 0.000 
         
Financial Realizations time t (reference category: ‘better’)         
‘Same’ -0.399 0.000 -0.145 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.054 0.000 
‘Worse’ -0.197 0.000 -0.071 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.028 0.000 
Choice threshold parameter 1 -2.831        
Choice threshold parameter 2 -0.935        
Log Likelihood -26722.7       
chi²  (p-value) 0.000        
Pseudo R² 0.057        
N 31925        
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include demographic and education controls, and year dummy variables (coefficients not 
reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table A1d: Ordered probit regression for financial forecasts measured at time t (M1) 
 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Futures 0.085 0.005 0.031 0.006 -0.019 0.008 -0.012 0.003 
Switchers In 0.170 0.000 0.064 0.001 -0.041 0.001 -0.023 0.000 
Selfs 0.236 0.000 0.089 0.000 -0.058 0.000 -0.032 0.000 
Switchers Out 0.260 0.000 0.099 0.000 -0.066 0.000 -0.033 0.000 
Pasts 0.162 0.000 0.061 0.000 -0.039 0.000 -0.022 0.000 
         
Financial Realizations time t (reference category:  ‘better’)         
‘Same’ -0.411 0.000 -0.148 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.066 0.000 
‘Worse’ -0.330 0.000 -0.116 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.057 0.000 
Choice threshold parameter 1 -2.628        
Choice threshold parameter 2 -0.832        
Log Likelihood -59554.8       
chi²  (p-value) 0.000        
Pseudo R² 0.059        
N 68659        
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include demographic and education controls, and year dummy variables (coefficients not 
reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table A2a: Ordered probit regression for forecast errors (M2) 
 
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(2) P>z 
MFX 
(1) P>z 
MFX (0 
) P>z 
MFX (-
1 ) P>z 
MFX  (-
2 ) P>z 
Aspires 0.109 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.024 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.024 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
             
Financial  Realizations time t (reference category: ‘better’)             
‘Same’ 0.039 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.007 -0.003 0.007 -0.009 0.007 -0.001 0.007 
‘Worse’ 0.393 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.084 0.000 -0.048 0.000 -0.081 0.000 -0.011 0.000 
Choice threshold parameter 1 -2.548            
Choice threshold parameter 2 -1.275            
Choice threshold parameter 3 0.217            
Choice threshold parameter 4 1.193            
Log Likelihood -38131.5          
chi²  (p-value) 0.000            
Pseudo R² 0.011            
N 31925            
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include demographic and education controls, and year dummy variables (coefficients not 
reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table A2b: Ordered probit regression for forecast errors (M2) 
 
Variable 
Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(2) 
P>z 
MFX 
(1) 
P>z 
MFX 
(0) 
P>z MFX (-1) P>z MFX (-2) P>z 
Futures 0.086 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.019 0.000 -0.008 0.001 -0.019 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
Switchers In 0.129 0.004 0.018 0.008 0.028 0.003 -0.013 0.020 -0.028 0.002 -0.005 0.001 
Selfs 0.135 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.029 0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.029 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
Switchers Out 0.064 0.081 0.008 0.096 0.014 0.081 -0.006 0.129 -0.014 0.075 -0.003 0.062 
Pasts 0.062 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.014 0.003 -0.005 0.009 -0.014 0.003 -0.002 0.002 
             
Financial Realizations time t 
(reference category: ‘better’)             
‘Same’ 0.027 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.002 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.001 0.007 
‘Worse’ 0.326 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.070 0.000 -0.037 0.000 -0.068 0.000 -0.011 0.000 
Choice threshold parameter 1 -2.544            
Choice threshold parameter 2 -1.324            
Choice threshold parameter 3 0.124            
Choice threshold parameter 4 1.105            
Log Likelihood -83630.6            
chi²  (p-value) 0.000            
Pseudo R² 0.010            
N 68659            
  
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include demographic and education controls, and year dummy variables (coefficients not 
reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table A3a: Ordered probit regression for realizations, conditional on forecasts  (M3) 
 
Dependent Variable: Realizations t+1     
Variable Coef. P>z 
MFX 
(Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Aspires -0.048 0.031 -0.017 0.030 0.004 0.019 0.013 0.034 
Financial Forecasts time t (reference 
category: ‘better’   
      
‘Same’  -0.340 0.000 -0.125 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.091 0.000 
‘Worse’  -0.901 0.000 -0.257 0.000 -0.054 0.000 0.311 0.000 
Financial  Realizations time t 
(reference category: ‘better’)         
‘Same’  -0.298 0.000 -0.107 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.083 0.000 
‘Worse’  -0.600 0.000 -0.197 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.188 0.000 
Choice threshold parameter 1 -1.509        
Choice threshold parameter 2 -0.217        
Log Likelihood -31873.0        
chi² (p-value) 0.000      
Pseudo R² 0.053      
N 31925            
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include demographic and education controls, and year dummy variables (coefficients not 
reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Table A3b: Ordered probit regression for realizations, conditional on forecasts  (M3) 
 
Dependent Variable: Realizations t+1     
Variable Coef. P>z MFX (Better) P>z 
MFX 
(Same) P>z 
MFX 
(Worse) P>z 
Futures -0.057 0.010 -0.020 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.017 0.011 
Switchers In -0.058 0.223 -0.020 0.216 0.003 0.123 0.017 0.232 
Selfs -0.023 0.165 -0.008 0.163 0.001 0.141 0.007 0.168 
Switchers Out 0.076 0.049 0.028 0.053 -0.006 0.096 -0.022 0.042 
Pasts 0.021 0.303 0.008 0.305 -0.001 0.328 -0.006 0.299 
Financial Forecasts time t (reference 
category: ‘better’   
      
‘Same’  -0.337 0.000 -0.121 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.097 0.000 
‘Worse’  -0.830 0.000 -0.239 0.000 -0.054 0.000 0.293 0.000 
Financial  Realizations time t 
(reference category: ‘better’)         
‘Same’  -0.294 0.000 -0.104 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.088 0.000 
‘Worse’  -0.611 0.000 -0.197 0.000 -0.004 0.023 0.201 0.000 
Choice threshold parameter 1 -1.315        
Choice threshold parameter 2 -0.069        
Log Likelihood -69074.9       
chi² (p-value) 0.000        
Pseudo R² 0.059        
N 68659        
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered by individual and include demographic and education controls, and year dummy variables (coefficients not 
reported). Italic indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, bold italic below 0.05 
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Figure 1: Summary of probability differences between different sample groups  
 
 
 
